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The central tension in capitalist democracy comes from the clash between votes and money.  
This conflict is at its most direct when money is seen to influence public policy at the 
expense of voters.  According to the theory of the political market, political contributions 
by business are investments in favourable policy outcomes.  The question of whether there is 
a political market has been one of the most enduring sources of controversy in the history of 
capitalist democracy across the globe. Moreover, business payments to politicians have been 
studied intensively by one influential group of political scientists: the specialists on the 
United States.  Unfortunately, this subject has not presented an opportunity for political 
science to make an important contribution to the debate on a matter of enormous public 
concern.  These political scientists have a very plausible theory but have not been able 
muster much direct support for the theory.  They need a new theory or new evidence.  I 
argue that the theory is good and that it is time to look for new evidence beyond the United 
States. 
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The political contributions of business are surely a most likely case for the 
economic approach to politics.  Indeed, it might even be said that it is a 
crucial case, a crucial case being “one that must closely fit a theory if one is to 
have confidence in the theory’s validity” (Eckstein quoted in George and 
Bennett, 2005, 120).  Often the utility of politicians or citizens is assumed to 
be relatively simple, when it may be complex and multi-dimensional.  
However, this problem is not so serious with firms.  They are profit seeking 
by definition.  A firm is an organisation dedicated to the rational pursuit of 
profit.  While there is no consensus on the existence of a political market, 
there are some relatively well-established observations.  I will review the 
literature on the American political market in terms of the basic categories 
of the theory: the costs and benefits of a political market to politicians and 
businesses; the distribution of business contributions across the political 
class; and the exchange of benefits between politicians and businesses 
 
Costs and Benefits for Business 
There is a supply of political benefits, which can be hugely valuable to firms.  
(Stigler 1971, 4-6)  These benefits can be targeted at particular firms 
(Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller, 1998, 68-71).  A huge lobbying industry has 
developed to help businesses win these political benefits.  Thus, it seems 
that politicians have something business wants.  The costs to business seem 
to be low.  It is extremely rare, even in the case of the most outrageous 
scandal, for the amounts of money involved to constitute a major expense 
for the firm in question.  It is also extremely rare for the amounts involved 
to approach the value of the policy benefit.  Possible negative publicity and 
the opportunity cost of management’s involvement in politics are other 
costs, which, again, seem minor in comparison to the value of policy 
benefits.  However, as Gordon Tullock observed a long time ago, when 
compared to the potential value of benefits, business spends very little on 
political donations (Tullock 1972; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 
2003, 110).  In recent decades, businesses have not even spent up to the low 
maxima set by legislation (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, 
108-109).  Experts are fond of contrasting the small cost of political 
campaigns with other types of advertising (Sorauf, 1992, 187).  For example, 
former Federal Electoral Commission member and Republican, Bradley 
Smith, recently said, ‘Political spending needs to be kept in perspective. 
Americans will spend about $12 billion on potato chips this year; Coca Cola 
will spend more on advertising this year than will be spent by all the 
candidates who have run for president. It costs money to communicate, 
whether you are talking about cars, cola or politicians.’ (Washington Post, 
2008).  It is likely that these small amounts are due to politicians’ incentives 
to control their own demand for business funding and their incentives to 
minimise the supply of policy benefits to business contributors. 
 
Costs and Benefits for Politicians 
Do businesses have something politicians want?   Politicians rarely reject 
donations.  They put a huge amount of time into fundraising.  However, 
business cash has very substantial costs.  Politicians must be seen to 
represent their constituency in order to gain re-election.  They cannot afford 
a perception that their political support can be bought.  In a democracy, 
politicians need to emphasise that the currency of votes trumps that of 
money.  Politicians have to manage their relationship with business 
supporters in such a way as to minimise this cost.  In terms of fundraising, 
politicians can try to raise money from non-business sources, in particular, 
ordinary voters.  To the extent that business funding in aggregate is 
important to them, they can reduce their reliance on any individual business, 
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by raising small amounts from a large number of firms.  The funding of 
American politics generally fits this pattern.  Funding linked with business 
consists of a small proportion of political finance.  The amounts given on 
behalf of individual businesses are too small for politicians to be worried 
about the withdrawal of support (Sorauf 1992, 172).  And crucially, the 
marginal contributors are individuals, not businesses (Ansolabehere, de 
Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, 124-125).  
 
Distribution of Business Contributions 
So the amounts of money are unpromising for the theory of the political 
market.  The distribution of business cash is much more encouraging.  
Business money is spent strategically on those who are most likely to be able 
to provide benefits: likely winners, incumbents, and those in powerful 
positions (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, 110; Krozner and 
Stratmann 2005; Stratmann, 2005, 147-148).  While the amounts and 
distribution of money are observable implications of a political market, they 
do not directly test the hypothesis.  In order to do so, political scientists 
need to establish a link between contributions and policy benefits. 
 
The Link Between Contributions and Policy 
Unsurprisingly, the evidence in relation to this part of the theory is much 
more difficult to summarise succinctly.  A huge, sophisticated literature tries 
to relate campaign donations to legislative voting.  A key methodological 
challenge has been the simultaneity problem: just as donations may influence 
votes, votes may influence donations.  A large minority of studies deals with 
this issue by using instrumental variables.  Many of the articles also exploit 
the analytical advantages of variation over time or variation within a specific 
policy area  (Stratmann, 2005, 143-44).  In three-quarters of the thirty-six 
articles reviewed by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder  ‘campaign 
contributions had no statistically significant effects on legislation or had the 
“wrong sign”’ (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, 113-114). 
Stratmann’s meta-analysis of the same sample of articles reverses the 
interpretation.  He consistently finds that contributions are statistically 
significant, although he does not provide an estimate of magnitude 
(Stratmann, 2005, 145-146).  Of course, politicians may intervene on behalf 
of businesses in ways that are more difficult to observe than votes.   
 
There have been various proposals to rescue this literature from 
frustrating dissensus. Milyo (2002, 158) and Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo 
and Snyder (2003) recommend accounting for a variety of motivations on 
the part of business contributors.  Baumgartner and Leech castigate the 
failure to incorporate opposing groups (1998, 131).  Smith emphasises better 
measurement of controls for legislator ideology and a series of variables that 
are likely to be highly correlated with campaign contributions (Smith, 1995, 
107-8).  Others have concluded that the theory of the political market ought 
to be replaced. 
 
The most radical alternative hypothesis is that firms do not seek any 
benefit from their contributions.  In the sociological literature, these are 
called ideological contributions (Burris 2001; Clawson and Netustadtl 1989, 
751); in economics “consumption goods” (Ansolabehere 2003, 125-127) and 
political scientists often term this sort of behaviour as “participation”.  
However, this seems like very strange behaviour for a profit-seeking firm.  
The strategic distribution of contributions clearly contradicts the theory.  
Moreover, Burris demonstrates that, while a number of proxies of ideology 
can predict patterns of spending by individual contributors, they do not help 
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explain corporate contributions. An emphasis on contributions as gifts also, 
sometimes, seems to assert that nothing is expected in return.  A pure gift-
giving interpretation is difficult to reconcile with some generally accepted 
observations.  Once again, if the contributions are pure gifts, why are they 
distributed strategically?  If campaign contributions are an unavoidable 
courtesy, like bringing flowers or wine to a dinner party (Milyo 2002), how 
do so many firms manage to avoid making them?  There is a clear consensus 
that business contributions are interested: ‘It is beyond dispute … [that] they 
give to influence governmental decisions’ (Sorauf 164). 
 
Sometimes the access (Hall and Wayman 1990), reputational 
(Krozner and Stratmann 2005) and interested gift (Clawson 1998; Gordon 
2005) approaches are presented as alternatives to the theory of the political 
market (Ansolabehere 125-127).  I interpret them as different accounts of 
how the political market works.  ‘Access’ is a word used by both academics 
and participants in the system of campaign finance.  Participants strenuously 
deny that they can, or seek to, influence policy with financial contributions.  
Instead, they only want access to politicians so that they can state their case.  
There is little point in access unless it increases the likelihood of a policy 
benefit.  It is not plausible that contributions are straightforward bribes, 
which guarantee a policy benefit.  There are costs to doing favours for 
business, which mean that politicians cannot always deliver benefits in 
return for contributions.  Moreover, as already noted, contributions are 
small and, anyway, the effect of money on campaigns is unclear.  It is better 
to think of access as a political market mechanism that delivers a low but 
significant probability of a policy benefit.  For a market in policy to exist, 
payments must increase the probability of a benefit by a minimum amount, 
which can be a long way short of certainty.   
 
The reputational approach can be interpreted in the same language of 
probabilities.  The more developed the reputation of a legislator, the easier it 
is for a business to assess the probability that she will provide a particular 
policy benefit.  In other words, a legislator with a reputation represents a 
lower risk investment in the market for policy.  Overall, the putative 
alternatives to the political market hypothesis are either variants of the 
political market argument, or receive even less empirical support than it 
does.   
 
Qualitative work demonstrates that campaign contributions do have a 
lot in common with gifts but these are interested gifts, ‘which create a 
generalized sense of obligation and an expectation of mutual back-
scratching’ (Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller, 1998, 19).  In other words, 
nothing is expected directly in return for a contribution but a contribution is 
expected to increase the probability of policy benefit being provided under 
some circumstances at some point in time.  Gordon has managed to 
produce systematic evidence of the benefits provided by interested gifts in 
the committees of the Californian Senate.  Businesses contribute to 
legislators in return for access.  When a vote is likely to be close, lobbyists 
increase the pressure on behalf of contributing businesses.  In such 
circumstances, legislators will change their vote because of their relationship 
with a contributing business.  In other words, they see a good opportunity 
to reciprocate a gift given in the past.  When their vote is not crucial, 
politicians will often vote against the preferences of their contributors.  It is 
only when their vote is crucial that they see an opportunity to provide a gift 
in return for their campaign funds.  Since these opportunities are rare the 
politicians incur only a minimal cost.  Gordon herself explicitly distinguishes 
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this gift relationship from a ‘market relationship, where one is traded 
explicitly for the other’ (Gordon, 2005, 21; Clawson, Neutsadtl and Weller, 
1998, 34).  She rightly says that it is not necessary for the above process to 
occur without participants’ awareness of the nature of the relationship and 
does seem to believe that this is actually the case (Gordon, 2005, 140-1).  
Ultimately, as Gordon seems to realise, this is a matter of interpretation.  
Nonetheless, there is at least one accepted observation that sits 
uncomfortably with the self-deception account.  If political contributions 
were always, or usually, unsolicited, albeit expected, self-deception would be 
more credible.  Instead, we know that politicians fundraise incessantly and 
solicit contributions from businesses, sometimes very aggressively (Clawson 
1998, 36-38).   This calculated behaviour on the part of extremely busy 
people suggests that they have, at least in a general sense, an awareness of 
the links between funding, access and public policy.   
 
I think the process Gordon describes is consistent with a political 
market.  It is not analogous to a market in goods, where there is a direct 
exchange.  Instead, business contributions are a small investment, with an 
uncertain and relatively low probability of a return at an uncertain point in 
time.  Moreover, the size of the return is also uncertain, but is likely to be 
very large indeed.  So, this political investment is a little bit like a venture 
capital investment.  This interpretation seems to fit the observable data quite 
well, without requiring ongoing self-deception on the part of politicians and 
businesses.  Perhaps its greatest weakness, is that even accounting for low 
probabilities and high uncertainty, the size of political contributions is still 
very small in relation to the costs and benefits of alternative public policies 
for large firms.  And, of course, there is little or no convincing systematic 
demonstration of the relationship other than Gordon’s pioneering work. 
 
A handful of articles take a more indirect approach and try to relate 
contributions to stock market values.  Jayachandran exploits the natural 
experiment created by the unexpected defection of James Jeffords, which 
shifted control of the Senate from the Republicans to the Democrats 
(Jayachandran 2006).   Knight successfully interacts campaign contributions 
with the probability of a Bush win over Gore, as predicted by the Iowa 
Electronic Market in 2000, to explain stock market changes (Knight 2007, 
406-08).  This line of research provides a promising complement, but not a 
real alternative, to attempts to demonstrate a direct link between 
contributions and favourable policies.   
 
Summary of US Literature 
In summary, the political market is one of the most frequently unproven 
hypotheses in political science, but has not been rejected.   Businesses 
contribute money, but not very much.  They distribute this money 
strategically, as if there were policy benefits to be had.  Politicians accept and 
solicit money, but not very much, and with a seemingly limited incentive to 
provide benefits.  Although, there are some positive results relating to 
legislative behaviour and stock prices, it has proven extremely difficult to 
demonstrate that there is a market for favourable policy.  In my opinion, the 
variation on the theory of the political market, which best combines internal 
coherence and consistency with relatively robust observations, is that of the 
interested gift.  Assuming (heroically) that my interpretation of the literature 
is accurate, the above is a summary of the literature on the political market 
in the USA and may (or may not) be of use for scholars who are normatively 
and substantively engaged with US politics as a subject in itself.  However, 
even if my reading is perfectly judged, the above is not a summary of the 
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USA as a case of the political market.  If we are interested in the political 
market as a hypothesis that applies to capitalist democracies in general and, 
indeed in the political market as a likely case for the economic theory of 
democracy, then we need to go further.  We require an analysis of the 
relationship between the US case and the theory.  The implications of the 
US research for the theory, and for the direction of further research on the 
political market hypothesis, depends on the extent to which the US is a most 
or least likely case.   
 
The US Case and The Rest of the World 
In this section, I will propose some criteria for assessing the likeliness of a 
country case for the theory of the political market.  I will assess the USA in 
relation to these criteria and evaluate the extent to which a consciousness of 
the theoretical status of the US case affects the degree to which the 
conclusion of the US literature can generalise to the theory of the political 
market.  The aim of the analysis is, firstly, to evaluate the extent to which 
political structures provide incentives for the operation of a political market.  
Secondly, and independently of the existence of the political market, we need 
to gauge the extent to which a given political structure is conducive to the 
observation of a political market.   
 
In the first place, the permissiveness of regulations affects, whether, 
and how, we can study the political market.  The “bizarre and incongruous 
regulations” pertaining to political finance in America (Persily, 2006: 219) 
are far from permissive for business contributions.  Businesses cannot 
directly contribute to election campaigns.  Instead, they can only engage in 
political finance through the unique institution of the Political Action 
Committee (PAC). A business can coordinate voluntary political 
contributions from individuals in the form of a PAC, which is, in turn, 
subject to contribution limits to party committees and candidates.  
Individuals are also subject to contribution limits, which include any money 
channeled through PACs. Until the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002, businesses could evade this structure by making ‘soft money’ 
contributions. These were contributions to parties that were spent on ‘party-
building’ activities, as opposed to contributions to election campaigns.  
 
While all studies take into account the precise regulations creating the 
measures they use in their models, they rarely question whether the 
measures are good indicators of the logic of business political behaviour.  
Perhaps contributions are smaller than the maxima because businesses have 
not been allowed make direct contributions?  Perhaps contributions are 
smaller than the maxima because the maxima are so low that it does not 
matter whether a contribution is trivial or less than trivial?  If larger 
contributions were allowed, would their meaning change from a gift to a 
purchase price?  Irrespective of the answers to these questions, there is little 
doubt that we would observe very different behaviour if there were no 
regulation.   
 
It might be argued that soft money provided a more permissive and 
still relatively transparent indicator of business calculations (Appollonio and 
La Raja 2004, 1136).  There were no limits on the amounts and, for elections 
in the 1990s, the amounts were reported relatively efficiently.  However, soft 
money was supposed to support ‘party-building’ activities and was not 
supposed to support candidates.  A lot is known about the sources and 
destinations of soft money.  There were significant differences between the 
identity of soft and hard money contributors, as well as the distribution of 
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their contributions (Appollonio and La Raja 2004, 1144, 1151-2).  Moreover, 
parties, the only recipients of soft money, spend their money very differently 
than candidates, the main recipients of hard money (Ansolabehere and 
Snyder 2000).  Undoubtedly, some of the soft money went to fund 
congressional candidates (Dwyre 1996; Magleby and Smith, 43).  
Nonetheless, in general,  ‘[w]hat is not known is to whom this money 
[went], and why’ (Drope and Hansen 2004, 29).  Therefore, soft money does 
not provide a clean indicator of business calculations and, like hard money, 
has major limitations as a data source with which to try to observe a political 
market.  Overall, the American system of political finance reduces the 
incentives for the operation of a political market by reducing the benefits 
available to politicians.  Also, to the extent that the political market exists, it 
will be very difficult to observe because of the way in which the complicated 
system masks the value business puts on any benefit from funding 
politicians. 
 
The second, and most obvious, criterion is transparency.  The 
American system of political finance regulation has been impressively 
transparent for a long time.  Candidates must disclose all donations from 
Political Action Committees and all donations of $200 or greater from 
individuals.  During the 1980s, the lack of disclosure of so-called ‘soft 
money’ was a major limitation to this transparency.  Unfortunately, 
transparency creates a dilemma for scholars.  Clearly, a transparent regime 
allows us to follow the money trail.  However, transparency substantially 
reduces the incentives for politicians to take part in a political market.  It 
increases the cost of relying on business contributions to fund campaigns; it 
increases the cost of relying on any particular business and it increases the 
cost of providing any benefit in return for financial contributions.  Indeed, 
since business PACs rarely contribute the maximum allowed, transparency, 
rather than limits on source, amount and purpose, may be the explanation 
for the small amount of money in US politics. 
 
The third and final major influence is the overall political structure.  
While the importance of this factor has occasionally been acknowledged 
(Sorauf, 1992, 237-41; Gordon, 2005, 136-9), there has been no attempt to 
develop comparative hypotheses.1  This issue is, at least, as difficult as any 
                                                 
1 One possible source of inspiration is the study of corruption but 
the analogy may not be strong enough.  The corruption literature 
tends to deal with instances where politicians diverge from their 
constituents’ preferences for personal gain.  This interest in 
personal gain is often conceived as a competing with the 
politicians’ interest in re-election.  However, in the political market 
under discussion here, politicians diverge from their constituents’ 
preferences in order to improve their chances of re-election with 
increased funding.  At any rate, the theoretical conclusion (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2005, 23) that dispersed systems reduce corruption 
conflicts with the empirical consensus that parliamentary systems, 
with their concentration of power, are perceived as less corrupt.  
Moreover, this conclusion is not supported by the more appealing 
experience-based measures of corruption (Treisman 2007, 228-236).  
My approach has more in common with general arguments about 
variations in accountability across political systems (Aldrich 2006, 
558-61).  What Aldrich (2006, 560) describes as the ability of ‘voters 
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other, which tries to relate broad institutional configurations to specific 
behavioural outcomes.  The political market hypothesis may be almost 
impossible to assess unless a number of basic conditions are fulfilled.    I 
assume a relatively competitive system in which the principal competitors 
are willing to provide policy benefits to particular businesses.  Parties, which 
are ideologically suspect to business in general, will not necessarily be any 
less willing than ‘pro-business’ parties to provide narrowly targeted benefits 
to specific firms.  Furthermore, a relatively stable party system is required.  
Party system instability makes it difficult to assess the political market 
because changes it is difficult to rule out that changes in donations are 
related to the new identities of political parties (McMenamin and 
Schoenman, 2007: 156-7).   
 
Since my aim is to assess the US case in comparison to other possible 
country cases, I will contrast relatively dispersed political systems, like that 
of the US, with the more concentrated systems of the other established 
democracies.  In a dispersed system, the mean cost of receiving interested 
money from business should be higher, as there is more direct accountability 
of individual politicians.  In a relatively unified system, costs are borne by 
parties, which are able to hide, diffuse and deflect blame in a way that an 
individual office-holder cannot.  However, costs should be more variable in 
dispersed systems, with a wide range of politicians, occupying a wide range 
of elected positions, under very different political circumstances.  Relatedly, 
the mean value of benefits to businesses should be lower in dispersed 
systems.  In the USA, a given policy benefit may only arise out of the 
complex interplay of the federal executive and the two houses of Congress, 
with their weak political parties.  In addition, the policy might be affected by 
policies at the state level.  In a concentrated political system, the benefits to 
business should be greater and clearer.    
 
Dispersed systems should have superior observability because of 
greater intra-case variation.  This can come from candidate-centred elections 
and from federalism, especially federalism that is symmetric in respect of 
both political finance regulation and political structure.  In unified regimes, 
there may be only two relevant political actors (the principal parties) and 
only one relevant election every five years (the legislative general election).  
The sources of intra-case variation are also sources of measurement error 
because of transfers between parties and candidates and between political 
actors at federal and state level.   
 
The case analysis is summarised in Table 1.  We can see that the 
restrictive regulatory system in the US reduces both the incentives for, and 
observability of, the political market.  Its transparent disclosure regime is 
necessary to observe a possible political market, even though it may make 
the operation of such a market more costly for politicians.  The dispersion 
of power in the US seems to be negative for a political market.  It increases 
costs to politicians and reduces benefits to businesses.  However, this 
dispersion of power creates variation, which can be very useful for attempts 
to test the political market hypothesis.  This advantage is partially offset by 
                                                                                                         
to hold their representatives accountable for failures to be 
responsive to their wishes’ is essentially the same mechanism that 
I use measure of the costs of politicians’ involvement in a political 
market.  Similarly, the ability of voters to hold their representatives 
accountable for failures to achieve outcomes I interpret as the 
ability to deliver policy benefits. 
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measurement problems resulting from transfers between candidates and 
institutions that make up complex decentralised political parties.   
 
This is obviously a preliminary analysis, especially in respect of the 
overall political structure.  However, it should be quite clear that the US is 
far from a crucial case for the theory of the political market.  Hopefully, I 
have also shown that case analysis of the literature on the political market is 
both possible and instructive.  In the next section, I use the same criteria to 
identify other possible country cases for the study of the political market.   
 
 
Table 1: Case characteristics and the theory of the political market 
Transparent vs. opaque regimes 
Politicians 
Transparency increases costs 
for politicians. 
Incentives 
Business 
Increase in politicians’ costs 
likely to decrease benefits for 
business. 
Observability Increases observability. 
Restrictive  vs. permissive regimes 
Politicians 
May restrict benefits to 
politicians. 
Incentives 
Business 
Decrease in politicians’ 
benefits likely to decrease benefits 
for business 
Observability Reduces observability. 
Dispersed vs. unified regimes 
Politicians 
Increases mean costs for 
politicians and their range. 
Incentives 
Business 
Reduces probability that 
politicians can deliver benefits as 
well as mean value of benefits that 
are delivered.   
Observability 
Candidate-centred elections 
and federalism introduce intra-case 
variation, which aids observation.  
Transfers between parties and 
candidates, and within parties, 
increase measurement error. 
 
 
 
 
Relationship between other cases and theory 
Political scientists have noted the global spread of political finance 
regulations (Scarrow 2007; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002).  Systematic descriptive 
study of these regulations has begun.  I am able to roughly categorise 
countries as transparent and permissive using the International IDEA 
Political Finance Database, which reports political finance rules as of 2002 
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(http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/index.cfm).2 Over eighty per cent 
of respondent countries, i.e. 93 countries, reported no ban on corporate 
donations.3  Therefore, almost all of these countries probably have more 
permissive systems than the U.S.  What is perhaps less well known is that 
disclosure requirements have swept across the world, with 53 per cent of 
respondent countries (59 countries) now requiring disclosure.  Sorauf’s 
celebration of the US as a beacon of political finance transparency is now 
seriously out of date (Sorauf 203, 229).  The “law of available data” (Sorauf 
164) no longer prevents students of the political market from travelling 
beyond the US.  Moreover, it is possible to find countries with a seemingly 
higher level of transparency than the US itself.  In Australia, all payments 
(and in-kind contributions) to political parties have to be reported, whether 
they are political donations or not.  In Britain, the sources of loans to 
political parties now have to be disclosed.  Even more striking is the 
combination of the basic data on permissiveness and transparency.  At least 
one quarter of countries that responded allowed corporate donations and 
required disclosure of donations.  If the same pattern were to be found 
amongst non-respondents, over sixty countries worldwide would meet these 
basic criteria.  Thus, on the basis of these two criteria, at least twenty-eight 
countries are more likely cases for testing the political market than the US.   
 
The net effect of political structure is more ambiguous than that of 
political finance regulation.  Nonetheless, it is useful to set out the basic 
characteristics of potential country cases.  It is possible to provide rough 
assessments of all the political system criteria, bar the willingness of parties 
to provide targeted benefits to firms.  Even where there are differences 
between parties in this respect, it probably complicates, rather than prevents, 
rigorous study.   
 
                                                 
2 A similar, and institutionally related, project contains data on 
disclosure but not bans on corporate donations 
http://aceproject.org/epic-en 
3 A further fifteen countries had some restrictions on corporate 
donations or disclosure.   
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Table 2: Countries with potentially observable political markets 
 
Constitutional Dispersion of Power 
High Low 
Party System Stability Party System Stability 
High Low High Low 
Australia, Bosnia, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Germany, USA 
Benin, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Peru 
Venezuela 
Albania, 
Denmark, 
Ireland, Jamaica, 
Japan, 
New Zealand, 
Norway, UK 
Georgia, Italy, 
Lesotho, Namibia 
Thailand 
Notes: The necessary conditions for inclusion were: (1) No ban on corporate donations; (2) 
Disclosure of donations to political parties; (3) Free or Partly Free rating from Freedom House in 
2008; (4) Population of over 1 million.   Netherlands and Spain fit the formal criteria but there is a 
very effective customary ban on business financing of politics in both countries.  A state was classed 
as dispersed if it was presidential and/or federal.  Semi-presidential Georgia and Ireland are classed as 
low dispersion.  I follow the majority of scholars in categorising Peru as presidential, even though for 
some if meets the definition of semi-presidentialism.  A party system was judged as stable if the same 
two parties had occupied the first two places in three out of the four last elections to the lower house 
of the national legislature (including constituent assemblies).  If there have been only three elections 
since a transition to democracy, the standard is two out of three.  If there have been less than three 
elections, the party system is classed as unstable.  Name changes were not tracked.  Also, parties were 
tracked, not electoral alliances.  Namibia is unstable according to the criteria used here, even though 
its main characteristic is the continuing dominance of one party. Sources for election results: 
www.ipu.org; psephos.adam-carr.net; africanelections.tripod.com.   
 
The USA is one of fifteen countries that meet the criteria necessary 
for inclusion.  It is possible to think of other ways of excluding countries.  
For example, de jure disclosure and de facto transparency is not the same thing.  
This is something, which would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
However, a reasonably good proxy might be perceived corruption, and 
several of the supposedly least corrupt countries in the world are included.  
Also, regionalised party systems might complicate analysis in Canada and 
Bosnia.  In many countries, the disclosure laws are new and that restricts the 
variation desirable for statistical analysis.  Nonetheless, Australia, Germany 
and Canada each have over two decades of records.    Even within the 
category of dispersed, low corruption countries, with national party systems 
and a long history of transparency, the US is, perhaps, not the best case.  In 
contrast to Australia (Young and Tham 2006), American federalism has not 
created a symmetric system of political finance regulation and its associated 
analytical gains.   
 
There are comparative advantages and disadvantages to testing the 
theory of the political market on the US case.  It is by no means a crucial 
case for the theory.  At a minimum, there are several other countries, which 
seem like other good candidates for political market case studies.  Indeed, as 
several elections take place under transparent and permissive regimes every 
year, there is increasing scope for comparative case studies in this area.  In 
the next and final section, I review the extant literature on these other 
countries. 
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Studies outside the US 
The political market has been the subject of very little systematic 
investigation beyond the US case.  The voluminous and impressive US 
literature ignores evidence from elsewhere.  A recent review article included 
eighty-four references, only two of which seemed to contain non-US 
evidence (Stratmann 2005, 152-156).  Neither of these articles seemed to be 
directly relevant to the political market hypothesis under discussion here.   
Recently, interest in the politicisation of the economy has increased 
enormously.  While most of this work does not focus on the USA, it does 
not test the theory of the political market as discussed here.  Instead, these 
works concentrate on political and social networks or straightforward 
corruption, rather than legal financial contributions to politicians (Faccio 
2006; Fisman 2001; Hsieh et al 2008; McMenamin 2004; Hellman et al 
2000).  There has also been a burgeoning of the small but long-standing 
literature on comparative political finance.  This is at least partly because 
scholars have pointed out the importance of the spread of political finance 
regulation across the world (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002).   This recrudescence 
still exhibits the legal and normative focus of the past literature (Ewing, 
2007; Ewing and Issacharoff 2006; Orr 2007; Smilov and Toplak 2007).  
Most of the evidence is anecdotal and very little effort has been put into 
exploiting the increasingly widespread official databases (Collins and O’Shea 
2000; Williams 2000).  Surprisingly, very little of this new work tests the 
political market hypothesis.  Two recent review of comparative political 
finance mention the political market theory only intermittently and implicitly 
(Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004; Scarrow 2007).  Their emphasis is instead on 
the implications of different patterns of funding for party political 
competition.   
 
Despite the general absence noted above, a small number of case 
studies present some interesting evidence, usually as an aside from the 
primary purpose of the article.  There are rough estimates of the amounts of 
business money in comparison with other sources of political funding for a 
large number of countries (Austin and Tjernström 2003).   Unfortunately, 
there is only fragmentary evidence on the distribution of money.  Both 
Fisher (1994) and Bond (2007, 76-77) have gathered data consistent with a 
strategic distribution of business funding in Britain.  By contrast, 
McMenamin’s work on Australia (2008) explicitly tests whether the 
distribution of business money is strategic.  Exploiting a large database of 
payments across seven Australian jurisdictions, he shows that business as a 
whole combines an ideological bias with strategic pragmatism.  If the left has 
the political advantage, the dominant strategy of businesses will be to split 
their contributions between the left and the conservative coalition. If the 
conservative coalition has the political advantage, the dominant strategy will 
be to clearly bias payments towards the conservative parties. Comparative 
case studies are extremely rare indeed.  A preliminary paper by Scarrow 
(2206) suggests the potential of a broader approach.  She compares the 
largest donations, both corporate and individual, to the two largest parties in 
Britain and Germany during one electoral cycle.  There are big differences 
between the proportion of party funding accounted for by these big donors; 
in its distribution across the parties and in its provenance from individuals, 
businesses or unions.  She provides some intriguing arguments linking this 
variation to political structure and political finance regulation.  Finally, 
Ferguson and Voth (2008) relate political donations to the Nazi party and 
stock market values.   
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Most of these papers make scant reference to the US literature review 
above.  There are very few equations – never mind simultaneous equations!  
It is an open and vital question whether the political market is a feature of 
capitalist democracy.  It seems very possible that it only exists under some 
circumstances (which may vary intra- and internationally) but we have not 
begun to investigate the scope conditions of the theory.   
 
Conclusion 
The theory of the political market, an investment of business cash intended 
to increase the probability of favourable policy, is vital to our normative and 
substantive concerns about capitalist democracy.  Moreover, it is a most 
likely case of the more general economic theory of democracy.  A huge 
American literature has led to formidable theoretical and empirical 
development.  It has failed to provide substantial direct evidence in favour 
of the theory, principally because of the difficulty of linking business 
contributions to policy benefits.  This has not led to a rejection of the theory 
due to the clearly strategic distribution of business money and the absence 
of any other theory that provides coherent story about why businesses 
should contribute to political campaigns.  In my opinion, there are two main 
reasons that the US literature has reached this impasse.  Firstly, the theory of 
interested gifts, explains why benefits should be so hard to observe.  A 
perception, never mind a reality, that a politician is obliged to any individual 
firm, is very costly to a politician’s reputation and political career.  
Therefore, the system of interested gifts is designed to make the political 
market in general hard to observe.  Politicians can point to repeated votes 
against the preferences of their donors, even if they vote in donor’s interest 
on the very rare occasions when their intervention is crucial and very 
valuable to their donors.  Secondly, the US system of political finance 
regulation is very restrictive.  It restricts the incentives to operate a political 
market and it makes a political market very difficult to observe.   
 
There are, at the very least, several other countries, with the 
transparency, permissiveness and broad political characteristics, which 
facilitate the study of a political market.  It would seem that there is much 
more value to be added to political science by an initial systematic study of 
these cases, than yet another, rigorous, but only very slightly original, study 
of US political finance.  I think it is time the American literature did some 
globetrotting.  Whether the American models travel in the hands of 
American political scientists or others does not matter so much as whether 
there is a rigorous research of an issue that is so normatively and 
substantively vital.   
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